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The Pacific Island microstate of Tuvalu has 
acquired a reputation for having a ‘high 
degree of political stability’ (Somoza 2001, p. 
832), and has a top Freedom House ranking 
for civil rights and political liberties (Freedom 
House 2007). Yet, despite regular elections 
and the absence of severe social crises, 
there has been - since 1993 - an increasing 
frequency of ‘no confidence’ challenges 
in parliament and resulting defeats of 
governments. Following an early post-
independence phase of relative executive 
stability, Prime Ministers proved much less 
able to sustain majorities in parliament. 
Seven different governments took office 
between 1998 and 2006, and none lasted 
more than two years. One analysis of the 
2004 parliament found that all but two 
of the then incumbent MPs had defected 
from one group to another at some point 
during their tenures (Taafaki 2004, p. 17). 
‘Political stability’ was a principle concern 
encountered during the deliberations 
of the 2000 Constitutional Review 
Committee (CRC).2  Its absence, linked 
to the manoeuvres of aspiring politicians 
and defecting government backbenchers, 
has sparked strengthening popular hostility 
and growing cynicism about parliamentary 
processes. At the 2006 election, all the 
incumbent ministers lost their seats, with 
the exception of the Prime Minister and the 
Speaker, and the turnover of MPs was higher 
than at any previous election in Tuvalu’s 
history. In response to long-run government 
instability, the new government introduced a 
constitutional amendment in 2007 increasing 
the size of cabinet by two, aiming to bring to 
an end an era where government majorities 
depended on sustaining a single pro-
government backbencher. 
In some situations, frequency of change 
in government may not be damaging. 
Indeed, regular turnover of governments is 
often deemed a sign of robust democracy 
(Huntington 1991, p. 266-67). Where there is 
little difference in policy between government 
and opposition, or where incoming 
governments simply continue where their 
predecessors left off, ostensible instability 
may disguise substantive continuity. In 
Tuvalu, however, this is not the case. Regular 
government changes have imposed high 
costs, for example due to the associated delay 
and modification of national budgets. Once a 
  The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu
2
confidence motion is carried in parliament, 
public service gridlock commences and 
endures until a new government is formed. 
In addition, to sustain Prime Ministerial 
majorities, incumbents have politicized key 
appointments, both at Governor General, 
Speaker and ministerial level. Parliamentary 
sittings have been curtailed to avoid no 
confidence challenges. As a result, according 
to the Report of the National Workshop 
on Accountability for Leaders of Tuvalu, 
1999, parliament had ‘failed miserably’, and 
was unable to ‘effectively legislate’ or hold 
‘officials and public institutions to account 
for the use of public resources in a timely 
manner’.3 
Conventional  responses to weak 
parliamentary oversight in Tuvalu have 
tended to focus on promoting reforms 
intended to ‘strengthen institutions’ so that 
these resemble more closely the Westminster 
ideal, despite the notable absence of political 
parties. Opposition oversight of the executive 
is to be enhanced by expanded usage of 
parliamentary committees, and by challenging 
‘the misconception that Parliament is the arm of 
the government-of-the-day’ (Clements 2000).4 
The familiar framework of a Leadership Code, 
Ombudsman and non-partisan Office of the 
Speaker of Parliament has been proposed 
to reinforce checks and balances, in ways 
that have been replicated across the Pacific 
Islands - promoted by the United Nations 
Development Programme, the Pacific Islands 
Forum and the Commonwealth. Despite 
recognition that parliaments have not worked 
in accordance with classical liberal theories, 
there has been little in the way of scrutiny 
of alternative forms of representation and 
accountability, even where – as in Tuvalu – 
these are already functioning locally. 
In this paper, we analyse the twists and 
turns of Tuvalu central government politics, 
particularly since the two elections of 1993, 
and consider an alternative framework which 
entails the abandonment of the unhappy 
institutionalisation of the opposition as a 
government-in-waiting, the introduction of 
an eight member executive representing 
all the islands, and the adoption of 
a stronger oversight role for the island-
based Falekaupule.5  In the first part of 
the paper, we outline the institutional and 
political framework established in Tuvalu 
at independence, and the way this has 
developed in the period thereafter. In the 
second part, we review the succession of 
governments, why each fell and how each 
sought to engineer for itself a longer term in 
office. In the final part, we review the 1997 
Falekaupule Act and the operation of local 
level assemblies, and set out our alternative 
framework, asking whether this might better 
fit the local customary framework as well as 
improving the quality of central government 
performance.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Tuvalu  means  literally ‘cluster of eight’ or ‘eight 
standing together’, a terminology that perhaps 
Table 1: Tuvalu Population by Home Island and by Island of 
Residence, 2002 
      Population by Population by
 Island of Residence  Home Island
Nanumea  664 1,560
Nanumaga 589 1,063
Niutao 663 1,453
Nui 548 835
Vaitupu 1,591 1,694
Nukufetau 586  1,149
Funafuti 4,492 1,004
Nukulaelae 393 461
Niulakita 35 2
Total 9,561 9,221
Source: Tuvalu Population Census, 2002, available http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/
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says as much about preferred institutional 
arrangements as about geography. The eight 
islands are located close to the equator in the 
central Pacific. It currently has a population 
of around 10,000, spread across a land area 
of 26 square kilometres.  The country has a 
sea area of 900,000 square kilometres, and 
is potentially threatened by global warming 
and rising sea levels.   Colonised by the 
British as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
Protectorate, Tuvalu peacefully broke away 
from Kiribati in 1975 to become independent 
on 1 October 1978, after a 92% vote in 
favour of separation (Macdonald 1982, p. 
256). Tuvalu nevertheless remained part of 
the Commonwealth, and the Head of State is 
the British monarch, represented within the 
country by a Governor General appointed 
on the advice of the Prime Minister after 
consultations with members of parliament.6 
Like many of the former British colonies, 
Tuvalu inherited a Westminster-style 
system, although with certain important 
modifications (not least, having a constitution 
in place of the classically convention-based 
Westminster framework and a unicameral 
framework). The constitution was revised, 
first still strongly inspired by British officials in 
1982, and then again - with greater Tuvaluan 
input - in 1986, but with ‘few substantive 
changes’ to electoral and political institutions 
aside from the introduction of procedures 
for the recall of non-performing members of 
parliament (Levine 1992, p. 493-94, 506). 
The original post-independence parliament 
had twelve members, but this was raised 
to fifteen in May 2000, making the retention 
of government majorities more difficult than 
previously.7 Tuvalu currently has seven 
two-member constituencies and one single-
member constituency, all of which return 
members by plurality voting (see map).8 
General elections are held every four years, 
with the result that there have been eight 
parliaments since independence.
The Prime Minister heads the government 
and is elected at a closed meeting of MPs by 
a secret ballot, after either a general election, 
the death of an incumbent, or the fall of a 
previous government due to a confidence 
motion.9  Confidence motions normally 
require two days notice, but with the consent 
Map designed by Michael Govorov
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of the Speaker can be moved without notice, 
by way of a suspension of the ‘Rules of 
Procedure’.10  When a no confidence vote is 
passed, parliament is prorogued immediately 
until the Governor General (GG) calls the 
meeting to elect a new Prime Minister.11  The 
Constitution permits the GG to exercise his 
‘deliberate judgment’ in regard to the timing 
of such election meetings12, sometimes 
controversially enabling politically aligned 
Governor Generals to allow incumbent 
governments to limp on in a caretaker role or 
providing them time to re-establish majorities 
in parliament. Besides the Prime Minister, 
there were, until 2007, five other ministers in 
cabinet who were also appointed from within 
parliament.13  The Speaker is elected from 
amongst the members of the House.14  He 
serves as the Head of Parliament, draws 
the equivalent of a ministerial salary and 
entitlements, and is normally also a Prime 
Ministerial ally. 
Although close to a third of Tuvalu’s population 
live on Funafuti, where the capital is located, 
citizens are obliged to register and vote on 
their islands-of-origin, unless they also own 
land or have resided for five-years on another 
island. Even with land ownership or residence 
qualifications, migrant voters are required to 
show evidence that they ‘actively participate’15 
in island activities, such as meetings, project 
works and church meetings, and that they 
also contribute monthly Falekaupule dues. 
Both members from each of the seven 
dual-member constituencies tend to align 
themselves on the same side during Prime 
Ministerial elections. In most cases, a member 
vying for the Prime Minister’s position is likely 
to be supported by his colleague from the 
same island. For example, the Prime Ministers 
Toaripi Lauti (1977-1980), Tomasi Puapua 
(1981-1988), Ionatana Ionatana (1999-
2000), Koloa Talake (2001-2002), Maatia 
Toafa (2004-2006) and Apisai Ielemia (2006-
today) all had aligned island running mates. 
Having dual tickets ensured that acquisition 
of the prestigious political power associated 
with the Prime Ministership consolidated 
island influence. However, there have been 
exceptions. Prime Ministers Kamuta Latasi 
(1993-1996), Faimalaga Luka (2001) and 
Saufatu Sopoanga (2002-2004) faced island 
colleagues who sat on the opposite side of 
the House.16 
More generally, there is absence of any 
durable basis for the emergence of regional 
factions in Tuvalu politics. Occasional 
relationships emerge between two or more 
islands, such as that which prevails between 
the traditionally close Funafuti and Vaitupu, 
but such arrangements tend to prove a 
counter-productive basis for securing a 
majority in Parliament, simply because 
these alienate members from other islands. 
The significance of the south in Tuvalu 
politics may, at times, have triggered some 
resentment amongst northern members.17 
Figure 1: Cabinet Ministers by Island Group, 1977-2006
Notes: for the purposes of this chart, we have included the Speakers amongst cabinet ministers (since 
they secure the same salary), but excluded Special Ministerial Advisors (since they do not). Figures are 
one short for 1993 September because Naama Latasi lost her seat, and no replacement minister was 
appointed to what was a caretaker government.
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The only Prime Minister to have come from 
the north since independence was Maatia 
Toafa. The other nine were all from the south. 
Nevertheless, despite some efforts, northern 
members have been unsuccessful in forging 
a homogeneous bloc. Efforts at constructing 
regionalist alliances have tended to be 
undermined by personal bids for ministerial 
portfolios or differences between close 
neighbours. Politics in Tuvalu remains deeply 
island-centric, and neither broader location 
nor ideology has provided sufficient support 
for the emergence of political parties.18 
As a result, no island has predominated 
either at the Prime Ministerial level or in 
cabinet more broadly, and no island has been 
kept persistently out of government. Figure 1 
shows the composition of governments from 
1977 to 2006, with the shift from six to seven 
office holders in 2000 reflecting the increased 
size of parliament. Nanumea and Niutao have 
been the most usually represented in cabinet, 
and Nukufetau, Nukulaelae and Nanumaga 
have been the most usually excluded. But 
there is no island, or island grouping, that 
has been consistently marginalized. Niutao 
and Vaitupu and, back in 1977, Funafuti, 
have had two MPs simultaneously in cabinet 
- but again each has also witnessed periods 
when they held no portfolios. Funafuti, the 
capital, has had three Prime Ministers, as 
has Vaitupu; but Nukulaelae, despite being 
somewhat under-represented in cabinet,19 
had Tuvalu’s second longest serving Prime 
Minister, Bikenibeu Paeniu (for the home 
islands of Prime Ministers, see Table 2). 
Tuvalu’s parliament has often been finely 
balanced between pro-government and 
opposition MPs, leaving Prime Ministers 
reliant on wafer-thin majorities. Constitutional 
restrictions limiting the number of cabinet 
ministers, aside from the Prime Minister, 
to one third of the house have determined 
the requirement for a majority. From 2000 
until 2007, in addition to relying on the 
votes of the Prime Minister himself, the 
Speaker, and the five Cabinet Ministers, it 
proved indispensable to somehow retain 
the support of at least one pro-government 
backbencher.20  Majorities were frequently 
so slim that the single pro-government 
backbencher potentially wielded considerable 
political leverage. Owing to lack of access 
to the rewards associated with being in 
cabinet, government backbenchers regularly 
defected and backed the opposition in no 
confidence votes, bringing about changes in 
government. There were four successful ‘no 
confidence’ votes from 1993 to 2007 (Table 
2), and another fifteen unsuccessful efforts 
to vote governments out of office (Table 3). 
In the absence of political parties and without 
clear ideological issues holding members on 
one or the other side of the house, there is 
little restraint on such side switching. 
To retain office, Prime Ministers resorted to 
tactics which occasionally put them at odds 
with the courts. For example, parliamentary 
sessions were frequently cancelled or 
curtailed to avoid the threat of ‘no confidence’ 
challenges.21  On average, parliaments sat 
TABLE 2: Tuvalu Governments, 1977-2006
Election 
Year
Parliaments Prime Ministers
Period in 
offi ce
Precursor of 
Change
1977 First Lauti (Funafuti) 1977-1980 National elections
1981 Second Puapua (Vaitupu) 1981-1984 National elections
1985 Third Puapua (Vaitupu) 1985-1988 National elections
1989 Fourth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1989-1992 National elections
1993 Fifth Latasi (Funafuti) 1993-1996 National elections 
- Fifth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1997 No confidence vote
1998 Sixth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1998 National elections
- Sixth Ionatana (Funafuti) 1999-2000 No confidence vote
- Sixth Luka (Nukufetau) 2001 Death of Ionatana
- Sixth Talake (Vaitupu) 2001-2002 No confidence vote 
2002 Seventh Sopoanga (Nukufetau) 2002-2004 National elections
- Seventh Toafa (Nanumea) 2005 No confidence vote 
2006 Eighth Ielemia (Vaitupu) 2006- National elections
Source: Hansard (Tuvalu)
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for only 25 days per year during 2002-
2006. Aside from the perennial need to lure 
opposition members to cross the floor with 
offers of ministerial portfolios, appointments 
to the positions of Governor General and 
Speaker were used to break up potential 
opposition majorities. The appointment of 
‘Special Ministerial Advisors’ was also used 
to complement cabinet portfolio holders, 
although this was subsequently declared 
unlawful by the High Court. Some stabilisation 
techniques used in other Pacific Island 
countries were not applicable in Tuvalu. For 
example, in Melanesia, pro-government MPs 
are regularly offered positions on the boards 
of state-owned enterprises to encourage 
loyalty to government. In Tuvalu, this is 
impossible owing to constitutional provisions 
preventing dual office holding.22   
This characteristic style of exercise of political 
power in Tuvalu stands in striking contrast to 
the experiences in the eight island councils. 
The Falekaupule resemble Parliament in 
having an executive arm - the Kaupule - but, 
unlike the parliament, the Falekaupule bring 
together all those aged 18 years or over.23 
Falekaupule are local assemblies which exist 
in all eight of the islands and are normally 
convened at three-monthly intervals. They 
tend to be dominated by elders and chiefs 
and sometimes by church pastors, although 
women have come to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the Kaupule committees 
(Kofe & Taomia 2006).24  Owing to the 1997 
Falekaupule Act, these local assemblies 
have full jurisdiction over island affairs, and 
have thus acquired many of the powers 
of the national government. Decisions are 
normally made through consensus, although 
putting matters to the vote has become 
increasingly frequently used as a method for 
resolving differences. Kaupule members are 
elected for four year terms, and the entire 
Falekaupule also gather to select a Chief 
Executive - the Pule o Kaupule - who in turn 
selects a deputy (Tokolua Pule o Kaupule). 
The Pule o Kaupule may be removed from 
office by two thirds of Falekaupule members, 
which has occurred, for example on Vaitupu 
in 2005. The six-member Kaupule also 
usually operates on a consensual basis, 
despite the Act providing for majority voting.25 
Most importantly for the purposes of this 
discussion, the Falekaupule have no history 
of repeated efforts to dislodge the executive, 
or opposition scheming, such as which 
animates the national parliament. 
One reason is the closer operation under 
customary norms, which indeed inspired 
the initial framing of the 1997 Falekaupule 
Act. The British colonial government, in 
the late 1960s, established island councils 
(or Fonopule), which worked reasonably 
effectively (Campbell 1977). The downside 
was that these were primarily linked upwards 
to the colonial administration, to whom they 
were dependent for local grants and to 
whom they delivered development plans. 
In the post-colonial years, the absence 
of grass roots control over these councils 
became increasingly vexatious, and the 1997 
Act inverted the relationship, making the 
councils (now Kaupule) more responsive 
to the Falekaupule, rather than central 
government. This was widely greeted as a 
success and regarded as having resulted 
in more effective development coordination. 
The 1997 reforms were further built upon by 
the 1999 establishment of the Falekaupule 
Trust Fund, which further extended island 
independence from central government.26  
A second reason is that the Falekaupule 
Act does not establish or elevate some 
alternative government-in-waiting alongside 
the Kaupule, but rather sets the voting age 
population to perform the role of scrutinizing 
Kaupule budgets, development plans and 
conduct over the preceding three months. 
In common with many Pacific states, Tuvalu 
is marked by an idealization of consensual 
harmony and stability as stipulated in the 
Constitution, but with an actuality of elite 
tension and individualism. Principle 3 of the 
Constitution emphasises the importance of 
culture and tradition in Tuvaluan society, and 
extols the virtues of communal solidarity and 
island-level co-operation:
‘…the people of Tuvalu recognize 
and affirm, with gratitude to God, 
that the stability of Tuvaluan society 
and the happiness and welfare of 
the people of Tuvalu, both present 
and future, depend very largely on 
the maintenance of Tuvaluan values, 
culture and tradition, including the 
vitality and the sense of identity 
of island communities and attitudes 
of co-operation, self-help and 
unity within and amongst those 
communities.’
  The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu
7
Principle 5 of the Constitution favourably 
contrasts the search for consensus with 
confrontational methods of handling 
government affairs:
‘In government and in social affairs 
generally the guiding principles of 
Tuvalu are - agreement, courtesy 
and the search for consensus, in 
accordance with traditional Tuvaluan 
procedures, rather than alien ideas of 
confrontation and divisiveness…’27
In practice, as we now turn to consider, 
‘confrontation and divisiveness’, and lack of 
‘cooperation’, have been defining features of 
Tuvalu’s political order, at least at the central 
government level.28
THE SUCCESSION OF 
GOVERNMENTS, 1977-2006
Prior to 1993, Tuvalu’s governments were 
reasonably stable. The initial four post-
independence governments all completed 
their terms in office. There were threats of 
social crises, for example owing to landowners 
on Funafuti objecting to those from other 
islands migrating to live and work on their 
island (Howard 1976). At the political level, 
scandals already threatened governments. 
For example, Prime Minister  Toaripi Lauti 
failed to secure the re-election of his 1977-80 
government after being persuaded by shady 
American real estate agents into buying 
desert land branded as ‘Green Valley Acres’ 
for over the going rate (Finin 2001, p. 6-7 and 
Cocombe 2001, p. 502, 647). No confidence 
challenges did occur, but all were defeated, 
in each case with the government retaining 
its majority by 7 votes to 5 (see Table 3). 
The pre-1993 period also saw the first ever 
usage of floor-crossing tactics. After the 1989 
election, Bikenibeu Paeniu broke away from 
the Puapua government, crossed the floor 
and became Prime Minister at the head of 
the opposition group.  
The September 1993 general election proved 
a watershed in Tuvalu’s political history. 
Three members lost their seats, including – 
TABLE 3: Motions of ‘no confidence’, 1977-2006
Period Prime Minister Motions Results Outcome
1977-1980 Lauti 0 - -
1981-1984 Puapua 0 - -
1985-1988 Puapua 2 Gov.  7, Opp. 5 Gov.  7, Opp. 5
Defeated
Defeated
1989-1992 Paeniu 3
Gov.  7, Opp. 5
Gov.  7, Opp. 5
Gov.  7, Opp. 5
Defeated
Defeated
Defeated
1993-1996 Latasi 2 Gov.  7, Opp. 5Gov.  5, Opp. 7
Defeated 
Carried
1996-1997 Paeniu 2 Gov.  7, Opp. 5Gov.  7, Opp. 5
Defeated
Defeated
1998-1999 Paeniu 2 Gov. 10, Opp. 2Gov.   4. Opp. 8
Defeated
Carried 
1999-2000 Ionatana 2 Gov.  8, Opp. 4Gov. 11, Opp. 4
Defeated
Defeated 
2000-2001 Luka 1 Gov.  7, Opp. 8 Carried
2001-2002 Talake 1 Gov.  8, Opp. 7 Defeated
2002-2004 Sopoanga 1 Gov.  6, Opp. 9 Carried 
2004-2005 Toafa 2 Gov.  8, Opp. 7Gov. 10, Opp. 5
Defeated
Defeated
2006-present Ielemia 1 Gov.  8, Opp. 7 Defeated
Total 19 15 defeats & 4 carried
Notes: Gov. = government, Opp. = opposition
Source: Hansard (Tuvalu)
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on the government side – Naama Latasi, the 
country’s first and only ever woman MP. The 
victor in her Nanumea constituency, Vavae 
Katalake, joined the opposition, depriving the 
Paeniu government of its majority. The result 
was a 6 versus 6 deadlock. At three meetings 
called by the Governor General to elect a 
Prime Minister, members proved unable to 
form a government. To handle the impasse, 
the Governor General dissolved parliament, 
in accordance with the constitution.29 In a 
petulant response, the Paeniu government – 
now serving in a caretaker role – appointed 
Tomu Sione as Governor General to replace 
the incumbent, who was approaching the 
retirement age of 65 (Taafaki 1996, p. 6). 
Sione’s appointment generated strong 
resistance from the Opposition side, who 
unsuccessfully demanded the deferment of 
the appointment until after the second election 
and the formation of a new government. This 
was a sign of the politicisation of key public 
appointments, and the usage of these to 
consolidate government majorities was to 
become increasingly apparent over the years 
ahead.   
In the wake of the November 1993 polls 
a realignment occurred. Kamuta Latasi 
had previously been a backbencher in 
Paeniu’s government.  He was a successful 
entrepreneur, who operated the local BP 
station and was exclusive importer of 
petrol into the country.  He was jettisoned 
from the ruling faction for criticizing his 
colleagues. Latasi had been dissatisfied with 
his colleagues in government.30 He claimed, 
firstly, that Ministers had spent too much 
time overseas. Secondly, he highlighted the 
inexperience and immaturity of the Paeniu 
government and associated leadership 
weaknesses. Thirdly, he claimed, there had 
been a lack of focus on development needs 
for Tuvalu. Conversely, Latasi was blamed 
by his former colleagues for masterminding 
the deadlock that led to the second election 
in November 1993. He was widely seen 
as having undermined the government’s 
majority by successfully lobbying for a second 
election that enabled the re-election of his 
wife, Naama Latasi, and hence the defeat of 
the former Speaker Kokea Malua.
Despite severing ties with the Paeniu group, 
Kamuta Latasi did not join the opposition. 
Instead, he remained more or less independent 
and drew three other members into a new 
camp, including his re-elected wife, Naama 
Latasi. Parliament was thus split into three 
groups, each with four members. On the eve 
of the election of the new Prime Minister, 
the Latasi and Puapua factions formed a 
coalition, and Kamuta Latasi became Prime 
Minister, with his wife, Naama Latasi, on 
the government backbench.  Unlike the 
pattern in later ‘confidence’ votes, marital ties 
ensured the loyalty of the solitary government 
backbencher.31
The Fifth Parliament (1993-1997) proved a 
period of mounting political instability. The 
new government was dogged by controversy. 
The post of Governor General, for example, 
became increasingly politicized, with the 
Paeniu government-supported candidate, 
Tomu Sione, being removed on 21 June 
1994. Sione had been part of the group 
that had sacked Latasi, and vengeance 
seemed the obvious motive for his removal. 
Conversely, the consolidation of opposition 
to Latasi was influenced by the reaction 
on Sione’s home island of Niutao. Two key 
issues served to undermine confidence in the 
Latasi government.   
First, whether or not Tuvalu should become 
a republic, severing ties with the British 
monarch, became a topical issue. A Bill 
to introduce a new national flag in 1995, 
removing the small Union Jack from one 
corner, was hastily passed through parliament 
without being sent to the Island Councils for 
comments, as required by the Constitution. 
Hostility to the intended new symbol of 
statehood was particularly marked on Niutao 
Island, the home island of sacked Governor 
General Sione. There, the flag was cut 
off at the mast while it was being raised 
on a flagpole by a police officer during 
independence celebrations (Taafaki 1996, 
p. 16). Tensions ran high and the police had 
to withdraw from the island. The reaction 
by the Niutao people was a clear indication 
of resentment about the sacking of one 
of their distinguished leaders. When the 
Latasi government eventually fell, after a no 
confidence vote in 1997, the new flag was 
scrapped owing to other islands endorsing 
Niutao’s preference for a reversion to the 
former flag. 
Land rentals proved a second controversial 
issue, which undermined support for the 
Latasi government. Land in Tuvalu is owned 
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by descent groups and families, but with 
growth in the size of kin groups, problems of 
distributing and sharing lease revenues had 
become increasingly acute, particularly on 
Funafuti. Following separation from Kiribati in 
1975, the government had acquired land on 
Funafuti to set up its headquarters, including 
offices and civil servant houses. In 1995, five-
yearly land rentals were increased by more 
than tenfold, from A$120 per acre to A$1,300 
per acre. This was a decision that mainly 
affected the capital, as government-leased 
lands on outer islands are few. Prime Minister 
Latasi’s constituency was Funafuti, where he 
was himself a significant landowner. That he 
had an eye to both political and commercial 
advantages was suggested by the fact that 
the decision was made despite opposition 
from the then Minister of Natural Resources, 
Otinielu T. Tausi, who was subsequently 
sacked after he protested. Tausi later defected 
along with Speaker Puapua, toppling the 
Latasi government and bringing Paeniu back 
to power. According to one commentator, 
an ‘obsessive personalism’ was increasingly 
characterising Tuvalu politics.32 
In the wake of the 1998 general election, 
Paeniu returned as Prime Minister, drawing 
on the support of nine other members. Only 
two members were left in the opposition. 
Former Prime Minister Latasi lost his seat, 
as did three of his opposition allies. Paeniu’s 
government was further consolidated by the 
introduction of Special Ministerial Advisors 
(SMAs), ensuring the support of the extra 
government backbenchers. At $13,000 
per annum, the SMAs secured a 57% 
salary increase over and above ordinary 
backbenchers and opposition MPs, and other 
perks of office comparable to Ministers. This 
was a considerable burden on taxpayers 
(see Table 4). Five years later, this method of 
strengthening cabinet majorities was halted. 
TABLE 4: 
Salaries of Top Government Officials & Comparison with Civil Service salaries
Source: Privileges Committee Reports 1998 & 2006; National Budgets 2001 & 2006. 1Plus additional 
allowances, including $60 for telephone rental and charges, free postage and fax, subsistence allowance 
of $25 per day when on official business, free internal and overseas travel on official business.  
Offices Salary Other 
Entitlements
1981 1985 1990 1992 1998-
2001
2002-
2006
Governor
General
10,560 11,064 12,374 14,625 17,300 23,768
House, gas, electricity, 
phone, car & fuel; 3 
housemaids
Prime 
Minister
10,680 12,204 13,873 17,244 19,700 26,660
House, gas, electricity, 
phone, car & fuel; 3 
housemaids
Speaker 7,920 10,980 11,912 14,772 16,718 22,395
House, gas, electricity, 
& car 
Minister 7,920 10,980 11,912 14,772 16,718 22,395
House, gas, electricity, 
& car 
SMA N/a N/a N/a N/a 13,000 (N/a)
House, gas, electricity, & 
motorbike
MP 2,640 2,912 3,836 6,000 8,300 15,393 Motorbike 1
Sec to 
Gov’t
7,620 8,184 9,216 13,000 18,098 21,743 Nil
AG 7,380 7,932 8,916 17,507 21,743 Nil
Auditor
General
6,504 7,008 8,112 9,960 16,561 20,070 Nil
Permanent
Secretary
6,900 7,416 8,388 12,000 16,915 20,070 Nil
Clerk to 
Parliament
3,528 3,876 4,476 7,000 12,141 13,719 Nil
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In 2003, Special Ministerial Advisors were 
declared illegal in the Tuvalu High Court.33  
Despite this consolidation of the pro-
government faction, the second Paeniu 
government soon found itself under threat. 
Government had approved changes to 
ministers’ transport entitlements from 
motorcycles to cars, relying on donor support 
from the government of the Republic of 
Korea. Arrangements had also been made 
for shipment of six Toyota RAV4 cars.34 
In April 1999, Leader of the Opposition 
Koloa Talake moved a no-confidence 
motion, alleging growing dissatisfaction 
with Paeniu’s leadership and raising other 
highly personalized charges. One of Paeniu’s 
Ministers, Ionatana Ionatana, and the four 
SMAs defected to join the two members 
in the opposition. The government was 
defeated by 8 votes to 4, and Ionatana 
became Prime Minister on 27 April 1999. The 
introduction of SMAs had clearly failed to halt 
the threat of breakaway by junior members of 
government, who still saw benefits attached 
to realignments that would give them top 
ministerial portfolios.
In December 1999, an amendment to the 
Electoral Act increased the total membership 
of Parliament to fifteen, thus shifting the 
number required for a parliamentary majority 
to eight.35 The three new members all joined 
the Ionatana government, a consolidation 
on the government side that was handled 
by a reshuffle of ministerial portfolio holders. 
The June 2000 government was carefully 
organised to ensure broader Tuvalu-wide 
representation in Cabinet, with one minister 
coming from each of seven of the eight 
islands. Again, the government proved short-
lived, although this time due to Ionatana’s 
death after a cardiac arrest. One of the 
government ministers, Faimalaga Luka, 
became replacement Prime Minister in 
February 2001. But his government was 
ousted in a confidence vote on 3 December 
2001, held while the Prime Minister was 
away overseas receiving medical attention. 
The rebels were all SMAs, one of whom, 
Saufatu Sopoanga, claimed that the Luka 
government had failed to implement motions 
passed in parliament.36 The fall of the Luka 
government came only six months ahead of 
scheduled general elections, and another of 
the SMA rebels, Koloa Talake, took charge 
briefly, before losing his seat at the 2002 
polls.
After the 2002 elections, it was Sopoanga 
who was elected as Prime Minister, but 
this government proved just as precarious 
as its predecessors – both owing to High 
Court rulings and threats of no confidence 
challenges. A 5 May 2003 by-election in 
Niutao, occasioned by the death of the 
Speaker Saloa Tauia, resulted in victory 
for Tavau Teii, who joined the opposition 
instead of joining the government. This tilted 
the majority in favour of the opposition. In 
the subsequent vote for a new speaker, the 
opposition candidate Faimalaga Luka won 
by eight to seven against the government 
candidate, Otinielu T. Tausi. Were parliament 
to have been convened, the Sopoanga 
government would have been toppled. 
As a result, the Prime Minister delayed 
convening parliament, as had the Latasi-led 
minority government back in 1996.37 In the 
intervening period, Sopoanga sought to lure 
an opposition member to cross the floor and 
to use control over prestigious positions in 
Tuvalu to restore the government’s majority. 
The successful tactic was to appoint the 
speaker, Faimalaga Luka, who was on the 
opposition side, as Governor General, thus 
reducing the opposition to seven members.38 
It was nevertheless a dangerous approach, 
potentially reliant  on  the consequent 
Nukufetau by-election resulting in victory 
for a candidate prepared to support the 
government. Instead, in the intervening 
period, the government lured opposition 
member, Leti Pelesala, to cross the floor 
to take up the spare portfolio vacated by 
Tausi upon his election to replace Luka 
as Speaker. As a result, the Nukufetau 
by-election dwindled in political significance.39 
The Sopoanga government typified the way 
in which dexterous handling of the distribution 
of ministerial and other top office-holding 
positions had become the lynchpin of central 
government politics in Tuvalu. 
A year later, Sopoanga’s government fell, 
after Speaker Tausi and new backbencher 
Elisala Pita sided with the six opposition 
members to oust Sopoanga. One reason 
was a visit by Sopoanga to Beijing, after his 
having indicated disapproval about Taiwan’s 
representative having too greatly associated 
himself with the opposition members (Taafaki 
2007, p. 278-79). This was controversial, 
according to one of Sopoanga’s ministers, 
because Taiwan had just commissioned an 
A$3 million 3-storey building housing the 
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government’s headquarters in Funafuti, and 
because Tuvalu had long-standing links 
with Taipei, rather than Beijing.40 Despite 
defeat, Sopoanga fought on. He resigned 
his seat, precipitating a by-election, and thus 
by constitutional means delayed the election 
of a new Prime Minister41, again buying 
time. At the resulting by-election, Sopoanga 
was re-elected. Yet instead of returning 
Sopoanga as Prime Minister, the government 
caucus chose to back his ministerial 
colleague, Maatia Toafa, for the position. 
That realignment was sufficient to bring 
Tausi back from the opposition, favourably 
altering the balance back to the government 
side.42 The result was that precisely the same 
ministerial line-up remained in office, barring 
the switch in portfolios between Maatia Toafa 
and Sopoanga. 
Table 5: Number of New Members, 
General Elections 1981-2006
Year Number Percent
1981 5 41
1985 3 25
1989 5 41
1993 (Sept) 3 25
1993 (Nov) 3 25
1998 5 41
2002 5 33
2006 8 53
Notes: Total membership of parliament increased 
from 12 to 15 in 1999
At the August 2006 general election, there was 
an extraordinary turnover of sitting MPs. All 
five Cabinet Ministers lost their seats, as did 
the three pro-government backbenchers, in 
a high turnout election.43  On the government 
side, only the Prime Minister and the Speaker 
retained their seats. On the other side of 
the House, the five opposition members 
were re-elected. The resulting government 
came under the leadership of Apisai Ielemia, 
reliant on the normal majority of eight to 
seven, as usual hanging upon the retention 
of the loyalty of a single pro-government 
backbencher. To consolidate that loyalty, the 
lone government backbencher, Tomu Sione, 
served as an acting minister whenever one 
of his colleagues was absent overseas or ill, 
and as a result received a government house, 
a ministerial salary for the days on which he 
acted, and other entitlements similar to those 
received by a minister. 
A year after the election, parliament 
acted to eliminate the precariousness of 
cabinet’s control over parliament owing to 
its constituting just short of a numerical 
majority. In August 2007, a constitutional 
amendment raised the number of ministers 
from five to seven, despite opposition from 
the islands.44 In addition to the votes of the 
Speaker and Prime Minister, this made it 
likely that cabinet would be able to command 
nine votes in the 15-member parliament, 
sufficient, if ministers remain solid, to defeat 
any confidence challenge. In the following 
section, we consider whether this, or an 
alternative reformist framework, best benefits 
Tuvalu’s people.   
DISCUSSION
Why did political instability in Tuvalu occur 
predominantly during 1993-2006 rather 
than 1977-1993? Was the earlier stability 
due to political or cultural characteristics of 
older members and absence of these traits 
amongst the new, post-1993, political gen-
eration? There were no major changes to the 
legal framework or to parliamentary standing 
orders across these two periods, aside from 
the increase of parliamentary membership 
from twelve to fi fteen by 1999, which brought 
about the perpetual need to retain a single 
pro-government backbencher. Yet the latter 
change occurred well after the onset of gov-
ernmental instability in 1993-94. It would thus 
seem unfair to blame institutional changes for 
the transition from stability to instability. 
There are several potential explanations 
for the post-1993 shift in Tuvalu’s political 
environment.
First, independence was widely seen as 
a valuable achievement for the people of 
Tuvalu, given Britain’s reluctance to concede 
partition from Kiribati.45 Despite the absence 
of resources delivered to the newly partitioned 
part of the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
colony and the, in any case, resource-poor 
character of the atoll economy, people 
from Tuvalu became strongly united and a 
nationwide fund raising program was carried 
out to establish a new Reserve Fund.46 
The creation of the Tuvalu Trust Fund in 
1987 also enhanced this sense of unity and 
nationhood.
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When independence came, the Tuvalu people 
retained a close sense of unity and cooperation 
in order to strengthen their nascent state. 
Latent tensions thus remained subdued and 
subordinate to a broader emphasis on nation 
building. Early Prime Ministers, such as Lauti 
and Puapua, were mild-mannored politicians 
with strong roots in their communities, unlike 
many of their successors.  As the colonial 
influence withered, however, the earlier post-
colonial unity dissipated, bringing to the 
fore a less externally influenced style of 
politics. The newer generation emerging in 
the political arena, less attached to the 
politics of post-colonial transition, began to 
master their bequeathed institutions in a 
manner quite different to their predecessors. 
This interpretation accords with the broader 
Pacific experience, as in western Melanesia 
and Nauru, where a post-colonial phase of 
government stability was also followed by an 
era of mounting instability.    
A second plausible hypothesis focuses on 
increased educational levels amongst later 
generations of politicians, as compared to 
the previous generation. With increased 
education, MPs acquired greater knowledge 
about how to manipulate the Westminster 
system to their advantage. According to 
this view, the first floor-crossing incident in 
1989 and the political crisis of 1993 may 
have served as the catalyst for continuing 
instability, in the sense of revealing easily 
exploitable aspects of the political system. 
Thereafter, governments learned new tactics 
for consolidating political power, while 
opposition MPs recognized, pragmatically, 
that severe institutional weaknesses yielded 
a continuing potential for attracting allies 
in perennial efforts to dislodge incumbent 
governments. If so, the 1993 crisis opened 
the floodgates to political disorder, and 
exposed the poor fit between imported 
colonial institutions and characteristic Pacific 
styles of leadership struggle. This second 
hypothesis is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the first, and both are consistent with the 
broader western Pacific experience.
A third credible reason is based on increasing 
competition for lucrative portfolios in 
government such as those of Prime Minister, 
Cabinet Minister and Speaker. The stakes in 
competition for government have been greatly 
raised since independence by continual 
increases in the size of the government 
budget.  Though small compared to packages 
received by their counterparts in the larger 
Pacific states such as Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea, ministerial portfolios are nevertheless 
the most highly paid positions in Tuvalu.47  As 
a result, they are greatly cherished, and 
perhaps have drawn ambitious public figures 
to contest election and to align themselves 
in such a way as to increase opportunities 
to join the government, rather than the 
opposition. Yet the data do not support 
such a conclusion. As Table 4 indicates, the 
salaries of backbench MPs have increased 
over 1981-2006 more rapidly than those of 
ministers. Permanent Secretaries’ salaries 
have increased at a similar rate to those of 
ministers.48  Thus, growing political rivalry 
cannot be attributed to the direct rewards 
associated with holding a cabinet portfolio.    
There have been three major ostensible 
reasons for the destabilisation of Tuvalu’s 
governments – (i) straying from caucus 
principles and policies, (ii) accusations of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and (iii) 
accusations of corruption.
(i) Straying from caucus principles and policies 
proved an important factor contributing to the 
downfall of governments of Latasi (1996), 
Paeniu (1999), and Sopoanga (2004). When 
Prime Ministers strayed from caucus principles 
or policies, or embarked on unilateral policy 
shifts, they regularly triggered dissent from 
colleagues and instability of allegiances. 
The parliamentary system in Tuvalu has 
developed in such a way that governments 
assuming power, to the extent that they 
remain temporarily stable, rule as a collective 
authority, via the caucus. The caucus thus 
becomes the core power base for each 
Prime Minister, and the key vehicle for the 
retention of the loyalty of ministers, the 
Speaker and the solitary pro-government 
backbencher. Once prime ministers become 
distracted from reliance on caucus, they tend 
to erode support, resulting in various forms of 
political crises. This fundamentally collective 
character of central government politics in 
Tuvalu accords with the basic principles set 
out in the constitution and with the practice at 
the Falekaupule level.   
(ii) Challenges predicated upon accusations 
regarding inefficient and ineffective 
government were used against many post-
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independence governments, and proved 
politically potent in dislodging several prime 
ministers. 
(iii) Governments have also regularly been 
threatened and defeated by accusations 
of ‘corruption’. The accuracy or otherwise 
of these allegations is not discussed in 
this paper.49  Whether or not corruption is 
a matter best handled within parliament 
or by the law courts, or other specifically 
designed apolitical institutions, is a regular 
source of contention, particularly on the 
part of those members who lose portfolios 
as a result of such accusations. Raised 
under conditions of parliamentary privilege, 
‘corruption’ allegations need not necessarily 
be proven before a government falls. Some 
institutions are undoubtedly required to 
tackle incidences of official corruption, and 
generate disincentives to such actions within 
the political arena, but these matters may 
best be handled outside parliament. 
   
More fundamentally, Tuvalu’s governments 
have usually been toppled due to power 
struggles, and the emergence of alternative 
coalitions bringing together opposition 
members with dissident government ministers, 
or – more usually – with the solitary pro-
government backbencher. The August 2007 
response, designating additional portfolios 
to cater for the aspirations of backbenchers 
and thus consolidate governments, may 
serve to diminish political instability. But past 
experience, as shown in the SMA debacle, 
shows that personal aspirations for political 
power are not necessarily stilled by such 
devices. At root, Tuvalu’s difficulty centres on 
the opposition not playing its constitutionally 
enshrined role as a check or balance 
agency scrutinizing government legislation 
or executive actions, but instead merely 
serving as a fluid government-in-waiting that 
continually seeks opportunities, individually 
or collectively, to enter government. 
The often preferred response, at least in 
regard to accountability, is to strengthen 
parliamentary oversight agencies by building 
up the offices of the Speaker and Clerk, beefing 
up parliamentary committees (particularly 
Public Accounts), reinforcing Leadership 
Codes or ensuring the implementation of 
actions recommended in the annual reports 
of the Auditor General and, generally, to 
appeal to the executive to function in a more 
responsive fashion. Yet, under the present 
set-up, restrictions on civil servants giving 
any information to opposition members 
ensure that their criticisms of government 
are rarely robust. Even highly critical 
Auditor General reports usually get the nod 
through parliament, and the Public Accounts 
Committee seldom sits. When the Public 
Accounts committee does sit, no action is 
likely to be taken subsequently, even where 
procedures suggest that legal action should 
be taken by the Attorney General.50  Pivotal 
to the strategy of beefing up the checks and 
balances of parliament is that the Office 
of the Speaker become reasonably neutral 
and independent, and this seems unlikely 
as long as the Speaker is elected together 
with the Prime Minister by a simple majority 
in parliament. Without that independence, 
the oversight functions of parliament are 
inevitably likely to remain weak.   
Given these long-run difficulties in national 
level politics, and the strengths identified in the 
local-level organisation of the Falekaupule, 
we might reasonably seek out arrangements 
at the national level which both resemble 
those at the Falekaupule level and articulate 
national-local linkages more strongly. One 
option is an eight-member executive, 
comprising one member from each island, 
so that caucus and parliament would become 
one and the same.51 This would have the 
advantage of reducing central government 
costs, while simultaneously removing the 
institutionalisation of the opposition as a 
government-in-waiting. Instead of a formalised 
opposition within parliament, the oversight 
role of the island-based Falekaupule in 
reviewing and initiating legislation would be 
strengthened. Falekaupule would acquire 
veto powers over legislation and tougher 
recall powers would enable them to dislodge 
non-performing ministers.52
Such an empowerment of the Falekaupule 
would entail a continuation of the devolution-
oriented reforms, as initiated by the 1997 
Act and the 1999 decision to establish a 
Falekaupule Trust Fund. During negotiations 
over the passage of these laws, there was an 
understanding that Kaupule members would 
eventually receive salaries as they came to 
play an ever greater role in controlling island 
affairs. Central government would still be 
required to play a coordinating and foreign 
policy role, but the burden of responsibility 
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would be radically shifted to the local level.  
  
There are dangers with such an approach. 
First, simply making the executive smaller 
would not necessarily eliminate caucus 
competition for the Prime Minister’s portfolio 
or ‘no confidence votes’, unless the Prime 
Minister/President were simultaneously to 
become directly elected.  Second, devolution 
of powers may eliminate central government 
rivalry in favour of a consensus-driven 
local politics that stifles opportunities for 
dissent (Besnier 1996). At the Falekaupule 
level, church influences or authoritarian 
pressures may diminish responsiveness or 
accountability, or capture policy-making.53 
The proposals here offer no panacea to deal 
with such issues. All they seek to do is balance 
more suitably local and national governance 
and eradicate institutional pressures that 
have encouraged merely intrigue-based 
changes of government. 
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no funds from the colony’s reserve funds, and 
with the uninhabited Line and Pheonix Islands 
becoming part of Kiribati, rather than Tuvalu. 
The Fund was called ‘Fakavae Tupe o Tuvalu’ 46. 
or ‘Tupe-a-Toeaina’, which was administered 
by parliamentarians at the time, and author 
was a former Treasurer/Secretariat. The Fund 
was invested in Australia but has now been 
returned to the individual islands, which had 
contributed in the beginning.
Since 1978, ministers salaries (leaving out of 47. 
consideration the worth of other entitlements 
such as government housing) have averaged 
three times higher than the salaries of ordinary 
government members.
This is despite the fact that the Prescriptions 48. 
of Salaries Act and Rule 48 of the Rules of 
Procedure provide for members themselves to 
determine their own salaries and entitlements 
rather than having a separate and independent 
body to do this. 
One of the authors is a Tuvalu civil servant. 49. 
General Administrative Orders (GAO) 5.3.5 
prevents public servants from publicly 
discussing corruption allegations leveled 
against ministers. In any case, many of 
the allegations raised in parliament were 
raised under conditions of ‘parliamentary 
privilege’ (as provided for in Section 114 
of the Constitution). Were these to be 
raised, outside the parliamentary context, 
the authors could potentially be subject to 
litigation. It is worth noting that the Freedom 
House surveys record that ‘Tuvalu is one of 
the few places in the Pacifi c Islands where 
corruption is not a serious problem’ (http://
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=
22&country=7293&year=2007). ‘Corruption in 
Tuvalu seems to be minor in comparison to 
that found in the Melanesian states and the 
larger Polynesian states, such as Tonga and 
Samoa’ (Goldsmith, ‘Theories of Governance 
and Pacifi c Microstates’, p109). 
There is no Director of Public Prosecutions 50. 
in Tuvalu, but the Attorney General sits in 
parliament as an ex-offi cio member. The 
Attorney General is responsible for cases in 
the High Court, whereas those in the lower 
courts are handled by the police. 
The executive would thus function as 51. 
parliament, as well as government, and 
this would logically entail the abolition of 
Westminster conventions about ‘cabinet 
confi dentiality’.
The Tuvalu Constitution includes a provision 52. 
for the review of all bills, after the fi rst reading, 
by the ‘local governments’ (now ‘island 
councils’), except those that have received 
a ‘certifi cate of urgency’ (Constitution of 
Tuvalu, section 111 (2), ‘Rules of Procedure’, 
S. 31 (A)). Of the Pacifi c Island countries, 
writes Crocombe, ‘Tuvalu may have the 
most extensive articulation between the local 
communities and the central government 
(Crocombe, The South Pacifi c, p554); ‘Tuvalu 
is best seen as a collection of eight or more 
local states, with central government acting as 
a coordinating device’, (Goldsmith, Theories 
of Governance’, p108).
For details of some of the pressures at the local 53. 
level, see Taafaki & Oh (1995), ‘Governance 
in the Pacifi c; Politics and Policy Success 
in Tuvalu’, NCDS, ANU, Canberra, p,11; 
Paeniu, B (1995), Traditional Governance 
& Sustainable Development in the Pacifi c, 
Economics Division Working Paper 95/6, 
Canberra, Australian National University, 
Research School of Asian an Pacifi c Studies, 
p16.
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